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There is a kind of intellect which is of this kind by becoming all things and there is another which is so by producing all things, as a kind of disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential into actual colours. And this intellect is distinct, unaffected and unmixed, being in essence activity.

For that which acts is always superior to that which is affected, and the first principle of matter. It is not the case that it sometimes thinks and at other times not. In separation it is just what it is and this alone is immortal and eternal.


Aristotle De Anima, 430a 10-24


The above passage derives from the much discussed chapter five of Aristotle’s De Anima which introduces the famous, or even notorious, distinction between active and passive intellect which commentators to this day have made so much of. The last sentence of the passage in particular has been much discussed and has received many interpretations ranging in extremes. On the one hand a transcendent interpretation of the text asserts that Aristotle is here ascribing to us a form of disembodied existence, at odds though this may seem to be with his hylomorphic model of physics and metaphysics. On the other hand, interpreters have adopted the line which claims Aristotle goes no further than the bounds of psychology, suggesting that Aristotle is doing nothing more thant parenthetically trying to explain why we forget things, whilst there is an active intellect in us which is always thinking and which therefore always knows things.​[1]​ Over two thousand yearstwo thousand years of debate has failed to yielded a unanimous conclusion on the issue, although, as we shall see, the majority of commentators assert that Aristotle is not advocating an immortal active intellect but rather discussing something in the realm of finite psychology.


Two commentators who, far from shying away from the issue, dealt with the elliptical nature of Aristotelian intellect head on. These are our two classical commentators on Aristotle; Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a detailed refection of both Philosophers’ interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, in particular, the dubious business of interpreting the mortality or immortality of active intellect. To address the complex issue of Aristotle’s theory of intellect this it will be necessary to explore beyond chapter five of the De Anima, looking into how both men deal with the rest of the text and indeed other elements of the Aristotelian corpus. In particular we will address how both men deal with Aristotle’s theory of perception as well as the nature and composition of the soul itself and thus how each of these issues relate to the interplay of active and passive intellect and the potential immortality of the active intellect.former.


In order to achieve this we must first spend some time detailling some of the key assertions made by Aristotle in the De Anima, placing the text in context within Aristotle’s wider physical doctrine. Therefore cChapter one of our discussion deals with Aristotle and the De Anima directly, addressing the principle principal concerns of the text. In particular this chapter will explain and assess Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism and its role in the composition and function of the soul. This section of the discussion will also include a brief observation of some of the contemporary debate into the role of hylomorphism, in an attempt to frame the potential interpretive positions that our two classical commentators may have taken.


The second and third chapters run parallel to each other, with chapter two focusing on Alexander of Aphrodisias and the third onwith John Philoponus. Firstly, each chapter provides an extensive background to each  of the philosopher and the subsequent academic influence each man had. They then deal with each commentator’s theory and treatment of the rational soul and thus the nature of the soul-body union. This all provides a context in which to assess theireach mans interpretation of the active and passive intellect and the possible immortality of the active intellect.


Ultimately what we shall find is that although Aristotle asserts with conviction the immortal and eternal nature of active intellect;, a literal, transcendent interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks at 430a10 may be proven to be at odds with the rest of the text and perhaps more damningly at odds with the wider Aristotelian doctrine, . Iin particular, his steadfast instance on the principles of hylomorphism. With this in mind we must question why, as a Pperipatetic, Alexander likens the active intellect with the Unmoved Mover, unambiguously asserting that it is; “That imperishable intellect which comes to be in us from outside. (Fotinis) ”​[2]​ In comparison Philoponus, the once Platonist, eventually Christiana Platonist and a Christian, and aand at all times critic of Aristotle, presents a contradictory interpretation of Aristotelian intellect to that of his peripatetic Peripatetic counterpart. Though Philoponus remains akin with his platonic Platonic world view, maintaining the immorality of the rational soul, he, unlike Alexander, refrains from asserting that the active intellect is immortal., Iinstead he framinges his account within in the realm of psychology, insisting that Aristotle is seeking to understand how it is that intellect understands itself.
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Chapter One

Aristotelian Ppsychology:;  Hylomorphism and, iits Rrelation to Aactive and Ppassive intellect..

“The soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially.”​[3]​

In terms of the cannon of his work, it is primarily the text of De Anima which sees Aristotle investigating psychological phenomenon, although elements of his psychology are also found in a collection of short works called Parva Naturalia. In contrast with De Anima, the works found in Parva Naturalia are more empirically orientated, investigating the phenomenon common to body and soul. In the De Anima Aristotle introduces the question of weather whether all psychological states are also material states of the body; “We seek to enquire into and ascertain both its nature and its essence, and after that all the attributes belonging to it; of these some are thought to be properties particular to the soul. (Hamlyn).”​[4]​ As Christopher Shields explains in his analysis of Aristotle’s psychology found in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the De Anima as a text is; “Generally more theoretical, more self-conscious about method, and more alert to general philosophical questions about perception, thinking and soul-body relations.”​[5]​


When discussing Aristotle’s psychological writings we invariably run the risk of anachronism if we are to assume his is a search for a philosophy of mind. Though the texts discuss the nature of the soul and its capacities, it is not obvious that they articulate a theory of mind as we know it. In the course of the De Anima, Aristotle takes psychology to be the branch of science which investigates the soul and its properieties, a position that Shields points out may strike modern readers as odd. Sheields highlights how in comparison with the modern discipline of psychology, Aristotle’s psychology is broad in scope, devoting attention to the question of life itself. Aristotle thinks of the soul as a general principle of life, with the result that Aristotelian psychology studies all living beings, not just those he regards as having minds, namely human beings. In this way Aristotelian psychology is demarcated in quite a different way from that studied by contemporary psychologists. Whilst the latter focuses on consciousness and intentional states, Aristotle’s is a theory concerned with providing an account of the life activities of plants and animals, alongside those of humans.​[6]​


Central to this account is the notion of soul as form which finds its home in Aristotle’s wider physical theory of hylomorphism. The term itself is a compound word composed of the Greek terms for matter (hulehulê) and form (morphemorphê). Throughout the De Anima, Aristotle uses such vocabulary derived from his wider physical and metaphysical doctrines throughout which the principle of hylomorphism provides the central conceptual framework.


The concept of the soul as form can be seen throughout the De Anima, particularly when Aristotle expresses states that the soul is; “The first actuality of a natural organic body. (Hamlyn)”​[7]​ Also that the soul must be a; “Substance qua form of a natural body which has life potentially.”​[8]​ And again that; “The soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially. (Hamlyn)​[9]​  Each of these claims defines the soul as the form of the body, which in turn is said to be the matter of the soul. In doing so Aristotle treats the soul-body relationship as a special case of a more general relationship which obtains between the components of all generated compounds be they natural or artificial. ”​[10]​ Each of these claims defines the soul as the form of the body, which in turn is said to be the matter of the soul. In doing so Aristotle treats the soul-body relationship as a special case of a more general relationship which obtains between the components of all generated compounds be them natural or artificial. In this way Aristotle’s view of the body and soul is an instance of what Sheilds Shields defines as “matter-formism”​[11]​


To understand Aristotle’s matter-form principle we must recognisze it in terms of the distinction he makes between different types of “substance.” In book two of the De Anima Aristotle states that; “Every natural body which partakes of life will be a substance, and a substance of a composite kind. (Hamlyn)”​[12]​ In describing living things as “composite”, Aristotle is placing them in terms of the differing substances. There are three kinds of substance; “One thing qua matter, which in itself is not a particular, another qua shape and form, in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular, and a third qua the product of these two. (Hamlyn)”​[13]​ Natural bodies, including living bodies, fall within the third class of substances as they have both form and matter.


To specify the form of a living substance is to cite its soul, whist to define the form itself is to state what it is to be that kind of thing. In an effort to elucidate the distinction between form and matter Aristotle asks us to suppose that an eye were and animal; “If the eye were an animal sight would be its soul; for this is an eye’s substance- that corresponding to its principle t that corresponding to its principle. The eye is matter for sight and if this fails it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, just like and eye in a stone or a painted eye. (Hamlyn)” ​[14]​ By this he means to be an eye in the proper sense of the word is to possess the capacity for vision. Irrespective of the material the thing is made of, it won’t be an eye unless it has that capacity. This analogy is designed to exemplify his general account of the soul. As we’ve already seen; “The soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially. (Hamlyn)”​[15]​ In this way, as form, the soul stands to matter as “actuality” to “potentiality.” “Substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, will be the actuality of a body of this kind. (Hamlyn).”​[16]​


In his essay found in “The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle” Stephen Everson explains how the matter-form distinction is designed to provide a material explanation and foundation to the psychic faculties. He claims that Aristotle takes it to be a requirement for a satisfactory psychology that it can explain why particular bodies or body parts are such to possess the capacities they do. All capacities of the soul have organs, except for nous as we shall soon see. Each sense is sensitive to at least one determinate range of properties and these are its objects, which are able to act upon it in virtue of what they are. For the relevant sense organ to be sensitive to its objects it must be constituted by matter which is capable of taking on the properties in the range.​[17]​


In this way the material constitution of a living body is necessitated by its form. Here we see Aristotle’s rigid distinction between form and matter playing out once again. We can see that Aristotle’s method requires that the formal and material description of a living thing be conceptually independent of each other. However as Everson points out, it isn’t clear how matter achieves this independence. Everson highlights the fact that many times Aristotle states that a dead organ is not an organ at all, as we saw with the analogy of the eye above. Everson frames the problem as; “Not only are organs ontologically dependent on the body of which they are parts, but the very notion of an organ is dependent on that of a living body.”​[18]​


In this way we see that the living body is constituted by its parts. At least to some extent the psychological states and changes of an organism are determined by its physical states and upon changing changes and from this, it would seem that psychological states and events are necessarily enmmattered. Just as living bodies can not be identified with their matter alone, so psychological events can not be identified with theirs. As Everson suggests psychological events, then, stand to certain physical events as form and matter; the bodily movements are the matter of the action, and some states of the heart are the matter of desire and in this way psychological events are causally related.​[19]​ From this we can see that Aristotle attempts to identify mental events with physical events in order to integrate the psychological within the physical world.


By far the greatest space of the De Anima is taken up by perception and intellect and the two are treated in an almost parallel way. Like perception, Aristotle characteriszes the mind, or intellect, in broadly functional terms, as it is; “tThe part of the soul by which it knows and understands. (Hamlyn)”​[20]​ In chapters four and five of the textbook three Aristotle approaches the nature of thinking by once again deploying a hylomorphic analysis, given in terms of form-reception. 


Just as perception involves the reception of a sensible form by a suitably qualified sensory faculty, so thinking involves the reception of an intelligible form by a suitably qualified faculty; “If thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being affected in some way by the object of thought or something else of this kind. It must be unaffected, but capable of receiving the form, and potentially such as it, although not identical with it; and as that which is capable of perceiving is to the object of perception, so must be the intellect similarly to its object. (Hamlyn)”​[21]​ According to this model, thinking consists in the mind’s becoming enformed by some object of thought mind’s becoming enformed informed by some object of thought, so that actual thinking occurs whenever some suitably prepared mind is “made like” its object by being affected by it. In this way the hylomorphic analysis of thinking can be seen as an extension of hylomorphic changes expressed by Aristotle in his wider corpus.​[22]​ Shieeilds frames the parallel analysis of perception and thought in the following schematic outline; for any given thinker S and an arbitrary object of thought O:


S thinks O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O’s intelligible forms; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by enforming it and as a result, (iii) S’s relevant capacity become isomorphic with that form.​[23]​


In this way we see the physics and metaphysics of hylomorphism rigorously enforced through Aristotle’s theory of perception and intellect, a theory characteriszed by the physical and finite interdependence of form and matter. By characterising intellect in such a way in book three, chapter four of De Anima, the next chapter takes a surprising turn , introducing the controversial and widely disputed active mind or active intellect which he characterizes as; “Distinct, unaffected and unmixed, being in essence activity,”​[24]​ going on to describe the active mind as; “iImmortal and eternal. (Hamlyn)”​[25]​ We must stress that Aristotle is not referring to an immortal soul but rather the immortality of a very specific part of the soul. None the less, the positing of active intellect into his theory of mind marks a significant shift away from the hylomorphism, which is so scrupulously characterised is up to this point; as such it presents serious interpretative difficulty.


The insertion of active intellect into the theory presents several crucial questions; how could the active intellect be separable if it is a capacity of the soul and the soul is not separable? How indeed, might a capacity be separated from that of which it is a capacity? Typically we expect capacities to be grounded and not free floating. Which This begs the question in what precise sense is the active mind separable, conceptually or ontologically? Should we in fact even regard the active mind as a capacity of the human soul, or merely as a concept posited by followers of Aristotle, which in reality is undermineslined by minimal textual proof? an Moreover, if active intellect is indeedassumption of some of Aristotle’s readers? Moreover, if active intellect is indeed a capacity of the human soul, does this then imply that Aristotle envisages some form of personal immortality for human beings, perhaps something akin to the view espoused by Plato in the Phaedo? These, and similar questions, have exercised the commentary tradition from antiquity down to the present day, with the interpreters providing vastly differing perspectives.​[26]​


Shields suggests that it is tempting to regard chapter five of De Anima as a sort of Rorschach Test for Aristotelians; it is hard to avoid the conclusion that readers discover the Aristotle they hope to admire. Christian exegetes tend to see it as a vindication of the compatibility of personal immortality and soul-body hylomorphism. ,O other readers, thinking that a non-starterOther commentators, regard the chapter as an abrupt change of topic in the mind of the De Anima, by contending that in it, Aristotle has left off talking departed from talking about human beings and has turned his attention instead to the impersonal self-thinking god of Metaphysics xii. In this way we see that the most consequential fault line concerns whether chapter five should be taken as characterizing the human mind or the divine mind. ​[27]​


Some Rrecent Aapproaches to Aristotle’s Hhylomorphism.

In his accompanying essay found in D.W. Hamlyln’s translation of Aristotle’s De Anima, Christopher Shields explores the range of recent approaches to Aristotle’s hylomorphism and the ontological commitments of this view. Shields asserts that; “Several scholars have forcefully challenged the credibility of Aristotle’s view, arguing that the deployment of Aristotle’s form-matter distinction in the philosophy of mind is at best infelicitous.”​[28]​ Two of the most forcible criticisms of Aristotle’s position are found in J. L. Ackrill’s essay; “Aristotle’s definition of Psuche”​[29]​ and the later Myiles Burnyeat’s text; “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?”​[30]​ Both of whomauthors seek to identify fundamental problems with Aristotle’s hylomorphism and its functionalists commitments. Before we observe the work of firstturn to these two commentators we must then take a look at the functionalist approach to hylomorphism.


As we have seen in our observation discussion of hylomorphism, Aristotle’s conception of soul is biological, meaning soul is that in virtue of which something is meaning soul is that in virtue of which something is alive. alive. It is in terms of the soul and its actions that we explain characteristic human activities such as nutrition, sensory input and thought, which are all teleological in their account. In this we explain movement in terms of goals they aim at, rather than in terms of the mechanical workings of the body which carries them out. Thus movement is explained in terms of function; what a thing does and what it does it for. As Marc Cohen explains in his essay; “The Credibility of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind,”​[31]​ it is in this way that there is no essential connection between, for example, the act of seeing and any kind of physiological process. As Cohen points out, rather seeing is functionally defined in terms of its object. The object of seeing is the visible and the visible is colour, thus seeing is the perception of colour. As Aristotle states; “Every colour is capable of setting in motion that which is actually transparent, and this is its nature. (Hamlyn)”​[32]​ In this way to describe an organ as an eye is to describe it functionally as the organ of sight which does not impose physiological constraints upon it.​[33]​


This represents the key element of the functionalism in Aristotle’s account, framed by the notion that that definitions of psychical states are always to be given in terms of form and function and never in terms of material composition. In this way Aristotle resists hard-line materialism and instead embraces what Bernard Williams describes in his article “Hhylomorphism” describes as; “A a polite form of materialism.”​[34]​ It is crucial to remember here that Aristotle did not have a philosophy of mind as such and thus was not aiming to solve the mind-body problem as drawn up by Descartes. As Cohen points out, since functionalism is a response to the Cartesian problem there is perhaps a clear sense in which Aristotle could not have had a functionalist theory of mind. Indeed, as Cohen explains, Burnyeat’s criticism of the functionalist interpretation makes a great deal of the pre-Cartesian character of Aristotle; “Burnyeat does more than dispute the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle. He also argues that when we correctly understand Aristotle’s philosophy of mind we realise that the only thing to do is to junk that the only thing to go is to junk it..”​[35]​


Burnyeat works on the premise that; “nNew functionalist minds do not fit in old Aristotelian bodies,”​[36]​ stating that while in recent years it is the mental half of Cartesian dualism which has come under fire, while the matter half has remained in tact in all of us. From this, he infers that while we have inherited our contemporary views of the physical from Descartes, Aristotle’s physics is markedlyso different from that of Descartes, and thus from our own, that no modern philosophy could share it. Burnyeat asserts that Aristotle’s solution to the mind-body problem; “Becomes becomes less attractive when we find that it is worked out in terms of, and cannot be understood apart from, various physical assumptions which we can no longer share.” ​[37]​ Burnyeat’s case against their functionalist interpretation rests upon two crucial claims about Aristotle’s theory of perception:; fFirstly, that a sense organ taking on a sensible form is an act of awareness rather than a physiological change, and,;. sSecondly , that it is possible for perception to occur without any associated physiological changes.


Burnyeatt’s considerations seek to present an additional reflection on the earlier text of Ackrill. Ackrill holds that Aristotle’s hylomorphism results in the claim that a human body is a human body only when it is ensouled, with the result that human bodies, unlike quantities of say bronze are essentially enformed, which, Ackrill claims, commits Aristotle to; “sSomething he cannot allow to be possible in the case of living beings, namely that what has the form might have lacked it - that the same matter has and might not have the form.” ​[38]​ At 412b20 of De Anima Aristotle’s contends that the body is homonymous, suggesting that a dead body is not a body except homonymously:; “The eye is matter for sight and if this fails it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, just like an eye in stone or a painted eye.(Hamlyn)”​[39]​ Here Ackrill observes that a commitment to homonymy introduces what Shields defines as; “A salient disanalogy between Aristotle’s prime examples of hylomorphic artefacts for example bronze statues and ensouled bodies.” ​[40]​ As Shields explains, a bronze statue is contingently enformed by the shape it has. Likewise, bodies are necessarily enosouled. Hence, whereas an enformed mass of bronze will have modal properties at a given time which its correlative form lacks, this will not be the case for living bodies. Thus Aristotle’s analogy breaks down; human bodies cannot remain bodies after loosing their form.​[41]​
































Just In the same way as the inclusion of active intellect provides a surprising turn in Aristotle’s De Anima, it provides a similar point of contention in Alexander’s commentary on the text. What Alexander does in his De Anima is to explicitly associate active intellect with the supremely intelligible, namely the Unmoved Mover. As he states; “This then is that imperishable intellect which comes to be in us from outside. (Fotinis)”​[43]​ This shift is a significant one and has been interpreted by many some commentators such as Paul Merlan as a kind of quasi-Pplatonic attempt to synthesizesynthesize the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle, a move that seems out of place from a card carrying Pperipatetic who strongly affiliated his philosophical position with that of Aristotle. So then, for us to attempt to understand Alexander’s deviation from the Aristotelian hard line we must first take a look at the history of the Peripatos and the shifting philosophical mood in the late second 2nd and early third 3rd century AD.


Following the death of Aristotle, the Peripatos continued to prosper in Athens for around another century. Tthe headship of their Lyceum passed on first to Theophrastus of Eresus who took over in the 114th Olympiad and ran the school for around thirty five35 years. As under Aristotle, the students were offered comprehensive courses in all known fields of study and indeed new subjects were added.  .Theophrastus himself established the science of botany besides that of zoology which went back to Aristotle.  The work of the school branched out in many directions from medicine to poetry, rhetoric to astronomy. As the work of the schools branched out in so many directions it was inevitable that its teachers and scholars began to specializespecialize, which resulted in differing views beginningan to be held within the school.


As Felix Grayeff points out in his text “Aristotle and His School”, even at an early stage the Peripatos showed a split. One the one hand, there were philosophers who took the logical-ontological aspect of Platonism as their point of departure, and others, who starting at the Timaeus, sought a scientific explanation of nature and Being. These were, as Grayeff explains,; “Opposite opposite approaches which were bound to lead not only to differing theses on particular questions but also, in spite of efforts to achieve a united Peripatetic doctrine, to contrary conclusions.” ​[44]​ This was a point much played upon by the Stoa, with Cleanthes said to have remarked:; “The Peripatetics are like lyres; their sounds are sweet but they cannot hear one another.”​[45]​ The headship of Strato of Lampsacus from 287 to 268B.C marked the beginning of the end of the lyceumLyceum. Although quite clearly the peripatetic Peripatetic philosophy was never quite forgotten, in Athens at least the School no longer existed. When Cicero visited the city in 79bc he found no trace of the Lyceum, the place in which Aristotle was deserted. ​[46]​


Although Alexander remained an Aristotelian, it was a result of the fractured nature of the Peripatos that the school itself eventually went into decline. Many commentators view the decline of the school as symptomatic The Lyceum may have been deserted but Alexander did not desert Aristotle. Many commentators view the decline of the school as being brought about by the lack of a distinct enough philosophical position, although it must be noted that openness to individual enquiry and critique was central to the Aristotelian ethos. In this way, Alexander’s reformulation of active intellect as akin with the Unmoved Mover may be seen as a suitably Aristotelian move; questioning and critiquing into order to elucidate the issue.  WeatherWhether he succeeds in elucidating or indeed obscures the issue is a question we shall ask later, for now we must perform our own elucidation on the tension between naturalism and mysticism which Alexander’s identification of active intellect with God infers.


In his article titledchapter on “Tthe Peripatetic School”, found in “From Aristotle to Augustine: Routledge History of Philosophy Volume Two,” edited by David Furley, Robert Sharples gives his view on Alexander’s text. He states that for Alexander, as for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover is pure form without matter, and thought is identical in form with its objects. Thus our minds in a sense become the Unmoved Mover while they think of it and as such can achieve a sort of temporary immortality, but this, Sharples claims, this is all. This is withoutWithout question,  this is an oversimplification of the issue which we will look at in far greater detail later. In highlighting the relationship between active intellect and the Unmoved Mmover,What Sharples does lays the foundations for do for us however is set up the possible an understanding of the transcendental “mystical” element of the text which we shall now see is taken up bmy Paul Merlan in his essay titled  on “Tthe Peripatos” in “The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy”. Sharples claimsstates that Merlan goes so far as to suggest that the whole history of the Peripatetic tradition in antiquity can be seen as an uneasy oscillation between a materialism insufficiently distinct from the Stoics and a belief in immaterial principles insufficiently distinct from Platonism, the lack of a distinct position being the crux of the school’s decline. ​[47]​


It should be noted that Merlan’s perspective is explicitly Platonic but it was after all the philosophy of Platonism which prevailed in late antiquity.. As such, his is an argumentnt which holds significant insight into the philosophical shifts that were taking place and at the time of Alexander. Like Sharples, Merlan pays special attention to Alexander’s positing of an active intellect capable of assimilating or identifying human intelligence with extrinsic intelligence, an intelligence which in turn is identified with God. While the section of Alexander’s text is open to debate, Merlan suggests that Alexander comes particularly close to saying that at the moment of assimilation, the human intelligence is “divinized”. At this point in the text, Merlan claims that; “Alexander is very close to the Aristotle Platonizans or semi-Platonizans.”​[48]​ Merlan states that despite Alexander’s nominalism and interpretation of the soul as entelechy and thus mortal; “In Alexander’s noetics we see Platonism staging a comeback within the Peripatos…the more Platonic the Peripatos becomes, the more it loses its raison d’etred’être.”​[49]​


In his essay titledon Alexander of Aphrodisias in theand the later Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, found in his text “Ssoul and intellect: Studies in Plotinus and Later Neo-Platonism”, H.J.  Blumenthal takes a differing view to that of Merlan. Blumenthal suggests that, of the commentators whose work survived in other than partial or fragmentary form, Alexander is unique in that he worked before the new Platonism of Plotinus and his successors who came to dominate Greek philosophy. Blumenthal here reminds us that a commentary should function primarily as setting out an honest interpretation of the author of the text in question, in our case Aristotle. By the term “honest” Blumenthal implies that many commentators have their own philosophical agenda which may be at odds with the views of the author they are working on. However Blumenthal here suggests that an honest interpretation is that which is closest to the author’s philosophical intentions.


Blumenthal highlights that the authors of the later Aristotelian commentaries were from the likes of Simplicus, Ammonius and as we shall later see Philoponus, were all practicing Nneo-p-Platonists, a fact which haswill have inevitable implications.  Blumenthal states that the Nneo-p-Platonists were given to seesaw in Aristotle some exponent of the same Platonist truth to which they themselves subscribed. This developed into what Blumenthal describes as; “aAn open and conscious attempt to harmonize that the thought of Aristotle and Plato, resulting in a sense that the real meaning of Aristotle’s text could be shown to be compatible with Plato’s philosophy.”​[50]​ As such the general approach by the neoNeo-platonic commentators was a sense that if one paid attention to the meaning behind the text and not the superficial impression created by the expression of it, one would find that what may seem seem like attacks by Aristotle on Plato are actually nothing of the kind.


Needless to say this seems out of touch with an Aristotle who, so the legend goes, is renowned for the assertedion that though he loved his master Plato, he loved the truth more.​[51]​ None the lessNevertheless there is a persistent attempt in the later commentaries to align Alexander’s interpretation of the De Anima as compatible with their own, in particular Alexander’s position that intellect in act intellect in act is the supreme cause of all things. As Blumenthal explains, to read Alexander un-Platonically was, to all late commentators, a sign of perversity, with Alexander often accused of twisting Aristotle’s texts to suit his own views, a seemingly strange accusation given the methodology of the Platonists.  As readers of such texts we always face the difficulty of knowing whether or not Alexander has been misinterpreted. The references to him in Philoponus, Simplicus and Stephanus’ De Anima commentaries, seem nearly all to be based on Alexander’s own lost commentary on the De Anima. ​[52]​As such we can only infer as the to weather whether or not they confirm opinions found in the treatises which remain.​[53]​


However, in the opening words of Philoponus’ De Anima commentary we see Philoponus citing Plutarch for the opinion that Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle was really a façade for the display of his own doctrines. Philoponus clearly concurs with Plutarch, claiming that Alexander wishes to drag Aristotle into conformity with himself; “So in showing his perverse understanding from the start, he produces a perverse exposition of the beginning. (Charlton)”​[54]​Such a defense of Aristotle may seem strange given that that basis of the neoNeo-platonic psychology is Platonic, in so far as there is no question about the separate and independent existence of the soul.. This begs the question as to wheeather any considerable part of a treatisey which starts from the opposite assumption can be fitting or uncontroversial.


Blumenthal suggests the cohesion between the two, i.e. Plato and Aristotle, arises because as, from Plotinus onwards, Nneop-Platonists accepted the main outline of Aristotle’s psychology in so far as it related to the soul’s function rather than its nature. As such any controversy was centeerered on the points where the soul might or might not have been separable from the body. The whole  central section of the soulembodied part of the soul; nutrition, reproduction, perception memory and so on, operated for the Nneop-Platonists in much the same way as Aristotle described, whilst at the same time being separable like a Pplatonic soul.​[55]​ In this area the main problem for the Neo-Platonists arose over the demarcation of the boundary between the higher, rational,, soul and the lower, irrational , soul, a problem hinted at by Aristotle:; “A problem arises straightaway in what way we should speak of the parts of the soul and how many there are. For in one way there seem to be an indefinite number and not only those which some mention in distinguishing them. (Hamlyn)”​[56]​ However, this demarcation does not appear to be of primary concern to Aristotle and seems to be have more to do with the neoNeop-Platonists’ constant anxiety to stress the independent nature of active intellect, than it has with Aristotelian doctrine.








Influence on Plotinus and impact on the Arabic Ttradition

Philoponus may not have been impressed by Alexander’s interpretation, however the influential fellow Platonist Plotinus was more enamoured. Fotnintis explains how Alexander’s notion of the productive intellect and the supreme intelligible influence the notion of the “one” and the “good” in Plotinus’ treaties. Following Alexander’s notion of the productive intellect as divine and intelligible in the supreme degree, Plotinus develops his doctrine of the “good” as the ultimate intelligible. Moreover, Alexander ’s identificationes of the intellect and the intelligible in the intellect; “The intelligible in act is identical with intellect in act, on the principle that the cognitive object is one with the knowing power. Therefore the purely immaterial form is intellect in the supreme degree, intellect that is (truly) in act.”​[59]​ This assertion appears to be the source of Plotinus’ identification of the intellect with its objects. This all suggests that Plotinus adopted what Fontinis terms; “Alexander’s rational mysticism.”​[60]​
	

Along with lexander alsoproving a divisive force for the Neo-Platonists, Alexander also had an had influence in the Arabic world and withand medieval scholastics who were much concerned with the problem of immortality. As we have seen, nothing Aristotle said about what came to be known as the potential or material intellect reveals the kind of entity he supposed it to be, nor is it clear wheather leaving the nature of intellect somewhat elliptical. It was the elliptical nit concerned him at all. By contrast, the nature of potential intellect in particular whichdid captured the attention of Alexander who construed the human potential intellect as a mere disposition in the human organism. In contrast, Themistius reached an opposite conclusion, paying heed to Aristotle’s characterizationcharacterization of the intellect as “unmixed” with the body and “separated.”​[61]​ He thus asserted that material intellect was a non- material substance which exists independently of the physical man.. 


As Herbert A. Davidson explains in his text; “Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of Active Intellect and Theories of Human Intellect,”​[62]​ in contrast with his Islamic predecessors, who placed no special importance onto the nature of potential intellect, Averroes was haunted with the issue and successive works find him struggling with his position. As an expounder and defender of Aristotelian Philosophy against criticism from Islamic theologians, Averroes invariably posed the question of the potential intellect against the backdrop of Aristotle and Alexander. As Davidson explains, the allure of both Alexander and Themisitus’ differing conclusions meant that; “Averroes found himself between two poles, both of which were grounded in Aristotle.”​[63]​ Averroes’ repeated attempts to resolve the exegetical and philosophical issues posed by Alexander’s theory, and to determine Aristotle’s true intent, led him to oscillate between the two positions throughout his career, a shift so powerful itf launched two Averrosistic traditions through the fifteenth 15th and sixteenth 16th centuries in the Jewish and Christian Philosophical communities.​[64]​


Treatment of the Rrational Ssoul.

As Anthanasios P. Fotinis sets out in the accompanying commentary to his translation of “The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias”, Alexander’s De Anima is basically a treatise on Aristotle’s work of the same name, though of course he does not simply reproduce the text. The originality of Alexander’s position is particularly clear in his treatment of the rational soul where In terms of the rational soul, Alexander’s treatment of nutrition, growth and generation can be seen as merely a development of Aristotle’s De Anima whilst his treatment of sensation and senses provide some tweaking.​[65]​


In his treatment of the rational soul heAlexander maintains that the power responsible for thinking and forming judgments is the productive intellect, which illuminates the material intellect to transform the potentially intelligible into actually intelligible forms. The intellect by the activity of the productive intellect develops its intellectual habitus and becomes acquired intellect. Most significantly, Alexander holds that the productive intellect, as identical to the divine intellect, is immortal while the material intellect is mortal.​[66]​


As an Aristotelian, Alexander bases his theory on the hylomorphic doctrine of the soul as the form of the body. The soul as the actuality of the body is united to it, as form is to matter and as such the soul is the actualization of the body. For Aristotle the soul as the form of the body is its reality. Thus the soul as such  a form of reality is always a definite form of determinate matter and ,as such matter becomes determinate by virtue of form. which by reception of this definite form becomes a determinate thing. Alexander holds true to the notion of the body as hylomorphic compound, disagreeing with any possible separation of the soul from the body. Holding with the hylomorphic thesis that soul is form-actuality and is therefore a substance, he states that the soul therefore belongs to the whole body. As a form of a natural body it is an actuality which is inseparable from its body. When discussing composite bodies we see that; “tTheir forms are not the activities proceeding from their potencies, but are these very powers; because they exist before the activities of which they are the source, the powers have priority over such activities. We conclude therefore that the first perfection of plants is their form, which is their rational soul. (Fotinis)”​[67]​






Treatment of the Ssoul-body Uunion

In his questioning of how the soul and body are united, Alexander generally follows the metaphysical doctrine of his master. He makes some new points but remains rooted in opposition to Plato’s view that the soul is an immaterial principle or essence which exists independently of matter. Alexander’s position is made clear in his claim that; “Every corporeal sensible substance is composed of a kind of substrate which we call matter, and of a nature shapes and delimits matter which we call form. (Fotinis)”​[73]​ The form, according to Alexander is the principle that informs matter; “Matter is the substrate which receives form, as form is the principle through whose agency matter takes on a specific shape. (Fotinis)”​[74]​ This is seemingly uncontroversial in its Aristotelian nature, however at De Anima 2,26, 26-3,2, 2 we see again Alexander coming closer to a Platonic sense of dualism. 


Here Alexander’s interpretation of the union of matter and form implies a kind of plurality of forms, a conception which forces him closer to Plato’s notion of the quality of natural bodies expounded in Phaedo when Plato states that; “Not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the name through all time, but also something else which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. (North-Fowler)”​[75]​ None the less, as Fotinis explains, despite the tweaking of the doctrine, we ultimately see Alexander agreeing with Aristotle concerning the way in which soul and body are united. Crucially, Alexander sees that soul and body are intrinsically related, since they are constituents of a single substance and hence inseparable and distinguishable only as principles.​[76]​


Now let us’s turn to the definition of the soul itself. We will remember that Aristotle defined the soul as; “tThe first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially. (Hamlyn)​[77]​”​[78]​ It is a substance in the sense of form, with form as the essence ob being acting as the principleIt is a substance in the sense of form, with form as the essence of being is the principle,;, “iIn virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular, (Hamlyn)”​[79]​ that is a particular concrete thing. Moreover, the soul is the actuality of the body, the principle by which we; “lLive, perceive and think. Hence it will be a kind of principle and form, and not matter or subject. (Hamlyn)”​[80]​ In defining the soul, Alexander complies with his master, concurring with the principle that the soul is the body’s first actuality, since it attributes life to the body of which it is the form; “Form is perfection by reference to the capacity for action”. From here Alexander defines the soul as; “The first actuality of a natural organic body, since it is its essential perfection. ( Fotinis)”​[81]​.







In this way what we see in the first part of the commentary on Aristotle’s treaties treatise is Alexander adopting a broadly Aristotelian definition of the nature of the soul, its union with the body, and its definition based on the hylomorphic interplay between form and matter. Broadly speaking, there is little controversy here. As Fotinis points out, while some might see Alexander’s adaptations as inconsistent with Aristotle, there is perhaps a stronger argument for suggesting that Alexander’s amendments work to solve dilemmas presented in Aristotle’s De Anima.​[84]​ It is not until the third part of the commentary where things get particularly divisive. In this final section of the text, Alexander explores the rational soul, the material intellect as habitus and the productive intellect. Generally speaking, the style of the section follows in the same vein as the one we have just explored, with Alexander generally concurring with the Aristotelian doctrine, whilst on these points modifying some of his masters’ conclusions. It is on the issue of the operation of active and passive intellect that these modifications are at their most radical, but we will save the best tilluntil last and turn to this issue shortly. First we must explore how Alexander understands the operation of the rational soul.


Material and potential Potential Iintellect

As we have previously seen, Aristotle holds that the rational soul depends on the lower parts of the soul, with intellectual power in particular being dependent on sensation. Alexander, like Aristotle, holds that the rational soul belongs exclusively to man. He also holds that the rational soul depends on the lower part of the soul inasmuch as; “tThe entire soul exists in a subject that is numerically one. (Fotinis)” ​[85]​ Also in line with his master, Alexander maintains the distinction in the rational soul with its “twofold power” of active and passive intellect. Alexander adopts the Aristotelian thesis that there is a hierarchy within the powers of the soul, with the higher powers of the soul being dependent on the lower. The point Alexander makes is to clarify what was not completely clear in Aristotle regarding the distinction of the soul into its powers. The clarification lies in Alexander’s move to make the distinction of the soul’s dynamic powers rather than a division of static parts.​[86]​


Alexander makes a similar clarification during his treatment of material intellect. As Fotinis points out, in describing Aristotle’s potential intellect as material intellect, Alexander introduces a new term into the Aristotelian vocabulary. In Aristotle the potential intellect is a thinking capacity without organs, existing only potentially:; “That part of the soul, then, called intellect is actually none of existing things before it thinks. (Hamlyn)”​[87]​ By introducing the term material intellect Alexander does not intend to introduce a new intellect, but rather to clarify Aristotle’s notion of the potential intellect.​[88]​ He describes the potential intellect as material, for; “wWhatever has the capacity to receive something is matter, with respect to the thing received. (Fotinis)”​[89]​


Alexander sees the material intellect as: “A kind of propensity suitable for the perception of intelligible forms; it is like a tablet on which nothing has been written, or more like the blank condition of the tablet itself, since the writing surface is an existent. (Fotinis)”​[90]​ Alexander therefore presents the material intellect as a pure disposition identified with its perceptive capacity insofar as it embraces every existent thing:; “For everything is a possible object of knowledge. Therefore although it is not actually any existing thing, it is potentially all existents. (Fotinis)” ​[91]​


The notion of material intellect as a pure disposition is a contentious claim and as Fotinis explains, such an explanation of material intellect is problematic. In uUnderstanding material intellect as an un-generated and incorruptible substance, that is to say, an eternal intellect, presents a difficulty. If the material intellect develops into the intellectual habitus by acquiring species of sensible objects, then these objects must also be eternal. Is If this were not true then the intellect as habitus, and the active intellect as speculative, would have no reason to exist in a world of temporality and generation; if the sensible objects were not eternal, there would be no object of sensation. However, if the objects of sensation were eternal, the material intellect, as an un-generated, incorruptible, universal substance, would receive all individual things in a single form. Fotinis rightly asserts that this notion is absurd as it implies that two people would have to have the same thoughts whenever one of them senses some particular object. For if material intellect was common to all men then each one of us would learn or forget just as the other men learn and forget.​[92]​


The Iimmortality  of Aactive Iintellect

This leads us to Alexander’s doctrine of productive intellect and its immortality. Alexander holds that the productive intellect causes the development of the material intellect into its intellectual habitus; “(All natural things) contain a principle that produces in matter the (forms) which matter is capable or receiving…It seems necessary then that these same distinctions should be found in the intellect as well, so that as there exists one intellect that is material there should be too an intellect that is productive. (Fotinis)”​[93]​ This intellect, existing within us as intellect itself without matter, is eternal which distinguishes it from the passive, material, intellect and its habitus. The productive intellect as anin independent reality apart from matter is intellect in the supreme degree to which it exists as an act of reason. It is the highest immaterial form and comes to us from outside us precisely as intellect; “For it alone among the intelligibles is intellect in its own being and not inasmuch as it is an object of knowledge. (Fotinis)”​[94]​

The productive intellect exists prior to its being cognizedcognized, since it exists from without. As such it transcends our senses, for it cannot be the object of cognition. Fotinis points out that Alexander seems not to consider the Aristotelian assertion that the potential and active intellects are both present in our soul; “Since (just as) in the whole of nature there is something which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is what is potentially all of them) whilst on the other hand there is something which is their cause. (Fotinis)” ​[95]​ Crucially, Aristotle holds that potential and active intellect are both parts of the soul:; “…and is productive in producing them all - these being related as an art to its material - so there must also be these differences in the soul. (Fotinis)” ​[96]​ In comparison comparison, Alexander holds only that the material intellect is part of the human soul; “This (material intellect) will be that form which is intelligible in the supreme degree, the one that is completely independent of matter. (Fotinis)”​[97]​ The active intellect, on the other hand, is; “sSeparated, impassible, not mixed with anything else; all these properties belonging to it because it is independent of matter. (Fotinis)”​[98]​


According to Alexander, the productive intellect is knowledgeable through itself with; “iIt is cause being of all the intelligibles. (Fotinis)”​[99]​ This intellect in act of its own nature gives intelligible things their intelligibility. As a consequence of his divinization of the productive intellect, Alexander concludes that only this intellect is immortal. The productive intellect is the divine element which is present in the soul without being its faculty. It is; “iImperishable, for such is its nature. (Fotinis)”​[100]​ Furthermore, Alexander maintains that the productive intellect is precisely what Plato calls the “Supreme good” and what Aristotle calls the “First cause”, that is to say Alexander affiliates productive intellect with the divine. The identification of the productive intellect with God suggests that Alexander’s doctrine is an attempt to harmonize the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.​[101]​ But surely we much must question wheather such a synthesis is dissonant with Aristotelian philosophy. Fotinis suggests that Alexander’s theory of immortality seems to be an oversimplification of the Aristotelian theory. As he says, most commentators on Aristotle protest Alexander’s theory, for they don’t want to see his opinion dominating over the Aristotelian theory of human intellect.​[102]​


From Alexander to Philoponus

In the first volume on pPsychology found in his text “The Philosophy of the Commentators: 200-600AD”, Richard Sorabji explores the subject on which Plato and Aristotle disagreed most which was simultaneously the subject on which the commentators went furthest beyond them in their search for an amalgamation. In the section on Aristotle’s active, actual or productive intellect, Sorabji observes how Alexander held that the active intellect is the first cause, namely God. As Sorabji explains, According according to Alexander, there are three intellects. We are born with a material intellect; the active intellect gives the material intellect its proper disposition. In this way we see that producing the dispositional intellect enablesing us to form concepts which we store in the dispositional intellect.​[103]​ As Alexander states in his Mantissa​[104]​; “For as light is the cause for colours that are potentially visible of their becoming actually visible, so this third type of intellect makes the potential and material intellect become intellect in actuality, by creating it in the disposition of intellection. (Sorabji)”​[105]​


As Sorabji explains, Alexander applies to active intellect the notion used by term used by Aristotle; of an ‘the intellect which comes from  from outside’.  the body. Unlike Philoponus, Alexander takes active intellect to be a non-human intellect. Philoponus gives a role in concept formation to active intellect but regards it as human. Sorabji explains how Philoponus makes active intellect inscribe imprints like the painter of Plato’s Philebus; “It should be known, then, that actual intellect is said to make all things because it inscribes the imprints of all things in potential intellect. This is who Plato too likens it to a painter​[106]​ and Aristotle straight off proposes that it is a painter,​[107]​ for if potential intellect becomes all things, actual intellect makes all things. So this can belong to human intellect. For it is not Intellect from outside that inscribes all things in potential intellect, but actual intellect in us (Sorabji).” ​[108]​ According the Alexander’s’ Mantissa, the active intellect is not in us all the time;intellect is not in us all the time; “It is the intellect said to be “from outside”, the active intellect not being a part or power of the soul, but coming to be in us from outside, whenever we think it (Sorabji).”​[109]​ In this way it comes or ceases to be present in us by being thought, thus when it uses our physically based blend as an instrument, it is said to be our intellect and we thinkIn this way it comes or ceases to be present in us by being thought, thus when it is uses our physically based blend as an instrument, it is said to be our intellect and we think.​[110]​.​[111]​










































As Richard Sorabji points out in his essay “John Philoponus” on John Philoponus found in his text “Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science”, Philoponus’ era of the sixth 6th century AD was one where in Alexandria, unlike Athens, where there was a history of antagonism,; Neo-Platonism reached an understanding with Christianity. Sorabji points out it was non’t just in Alexandria but in Rome as well, where at the same time Boethius was producing Christian works tinged with Nneoplatonic logic. Moreover, over over 100 yearsa hundred years earlierlater Augustine had been led to Christianity through reading Platonist works and at first had found it difficult to see any conflict between them.​[113]​


In his essay “John on Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: Two Neo-Platonic Christian Commentaries on Aristotle?”, found in his text “Soul and Intellect Studies in Plotinus and Later Neo-Platonism”, H.J. Blumenthall questions how much difference there is between the commentaries of the two men and indeed weather whether the cannon of work should be considered as representative of the work of one commentator or two. Blumenthal suggests that a look at the structure and detailed content of some of the comparable parts of each commentary shows they are independent. For example, in De Anima 3.4, where Aristotle turns from discussing imagination to thought,; from the irrational to the rational soul. The latter distinction is not is not present explicitly in Aristotle’s treaties treatise but is a major concern of the Nneoplatonist commentators who were preoccupied with the allocation of soul’s faculties and activities and activities to its higher or lower sectionsparts.​[114]​ Thus the commentators with their special concerns have Aristotle ask three questions. 

Philoponus sees these as follows.; Iis the rational soul separable or inseparable? How does it differ from the sensible? How does intellect happen in us? Stephanus’ like list is not the same, the three questions he asks are: ; Is the soul destructible or not? How does the rational soul differ from the sensible? How does intellect take place?​[115]​ The questions clearly differ, showing the difference in the organization of material, highlighting a difference in presentation and substance between the two commentaries, which Blumenthal; claims should be suffice to show we have two separate commentaries.​[116]​

 
As to the question of Philoponus’ religion, Blumenthal explains that until recently it had been commonly thought that Philoponus began his philosophical activities as a pagan and subsequently became a convert of Christianity after he had written his commentaries. However more recent commentators have suggested that Philoponus was Christian when he wrote the De Anima commentary. On the basis of his view on the movement of the heavenly bodies and his understanding of Aristotle’s fifth element, some have argued there is no chronological separation between the commentaries and the other works.​[117]​






Turning to Philoponus’ work itself we find that it includes four groups of writings; philosophical works, theological works, grammatical works and miscellaneous scientific works, of which several of his writings are lost. For some of the titles attributed to him it is unclear whether they existed at all or still exist in manuscript. In his article “John Philoponus” essay on Philoponus found in “The Cambridge History of Philosophy in late Antiquity Volume II”   Koenraad Verrycken suggests that a certain number of works or at least parts of them that have been attributed to Philoponus are probably or certainly spurious. As Verrycken highlights in the work on Philoponus’ De Anima text, the editor M. Hayduck already questioned Philoponus’ authorship of book III and thought that Stephanus may be the real author.​[119]​


Philoponus worked on other commentaries on Aristotle including “In Analytica Priora”, “In Analytica Posteriora” and “In De Generatione et Corruptione.” Philoponus also produced several important theological works, amongst the most important surviving texts includes; “De Opifico Mundi,” a commentary on the cosmology of Genesis. Also Additionally, “De Resurectione,” in which Philoponus rejects the idea that it is our earthly body that will resurrect from the dead at the end of time.​[120]​ 


As Verrycken points out, there is a strong tendency in the research on Philoponus to understand his work in its entirety against the backdrop of his Christian “convictions” and to speak of “the” philosophy of Philoponus. Verrychken claims that it may be demonstrated that there are two distinguishable systems at play in Philoponus’ philosophical works. Verycken frames the dichotomy as such; the first of these systems, “Philoponus I”, can be called the Alexandrian form of Platonism. He claims it does not contribute a return to a pre-Plotinan pre-Plotinan form of Platonism whilst also neither being identical with contemporary Athenian Platonism. “Philoponus II” appears in II” takes off in 529AD where Philoponus’ philosophical work becomes based on the Christian idea of creation and rejects the basics tenets of his own earlier philosophy.​[121]​​[122]​


On this premise, according to Verrycken, what we see in Philoponus’ De Anima commentary is the workings of the early Philoponus I representing a Platonic interpretation of Aristotle. Characteristic of such a position regardingis Philoponus I’ Philoponus I’ is what Verrycken describes as a; “Platonizing approach to Aristotle” and attempts to; “upgrade Aristotle in comparison with Plato and to put their respective metaphysics at the same level.”​[123]​ This is a point played out, Verycken claims, in Philoponus’ De Anima and De Intellectu, where Aristotle’s psychology is, to a certain extent, harmoniszed with that of Plato.





Philoponus’ Iinfluence on the Monophysite  Christology

Philoponus’ Christian faith is an interesting issue and as we have seen there is much debate as to weather whether he was indeed Christian from the beginning. Sorabji suggests that faith itself wasn’t reserved for the latter part of his career but rather the major part of his writings were about faith.​[126]​ By this time Philoponus had become a leading intellectual, in particular in the theological movement of the monophysites who were intent on emphasizing the divinity of Christ. In his essay found in the online archive of the “Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy” Christian Wildberg explains that by the end of 530 AD of the 530’s’s AD, , Philoponus seems to have stopped producing philosophical works, focusing instead on his theological treatises. Wildberg explains that on the eve of the fifth council, in Constantinople 553AD, Philoponus stepped forward as a partisan of monophysite Christology who had become increasingly influential in the eastern part of the Roman empire. Philoponus’ text Arbiter was particularly influential where he assessed the claims of the Christological formulae enuntiated enuntiated at the council of Chalcedon in 451AD. The monophysites were scandaliszed by the formulae which asserted that Christ is one person and one hypostastis but who is also discerniable in two natures. In Arbiter Philoponus takes the view that the locution “discerniable in two natures” should be abandoned, arguing that in the context the two terms “nature” and “hypostastis” are virtually identical. Thus Philoponus asserts that Christ must be of one particular nature and not two, a deduction which became central to the monophysite doctrine. ​[127]​


Treatment of the Rrational Ssoul.

With Philoponus’ background and influence framed, let us now move to his treatment of the rational soul. Philoponus’ text “On Aristotle on the Soul “On Aristotle on the Soul, 1.3-5” discusses whether the soul should be defined as producing motion or cognition, or instead should it be defined in terms of the composition of the body. In the preface to Philip Van Der Eijk’sHayducks translation of the text Sorabji explains how chapter three of the text considers Aristotle’s attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher Plato since as Philoponus comments that; “What he (Aristotle) says here is directed particularly at Plato; this is what he has added to saying “those who say that the soul moves itself” the phrase “or what is able to move itself. (Van Der Eijk)””.​[128]​  Plato defines the soul in Phaedrus as immortal and thus self moving:; “Every soul is immortal, for that which is ever moving is immortal, but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, cases to live. (North-Fowler)”​[129]​  Moreover, in Timaeus Plato makes the soul move the body by the body being motion in itself. Plato makes the soul move the body by being motion in itself. The idea that the soul is in motion seems unmistakable in Timaeus where Plato states:; “The wild species of animal that goes on foot is derived from those men who have derived from those men who have paid no attention at all to philosophy nor studied at all the natures of the heavens, because they ceased to make use of the revolutions in the head and followed the lead of those parts of the soul which are in the breast. (Lamb)”​[130]​ Such assertions are repeated throughout the text so much so that Sorabji suggests that Philoponus; “Practically stands on his head to reinterpret Plato as not meaning real motion.”​[131]​


Sorabji explains how Ammonious was Proclus’ pupil and believed in harmoniszing Plato and Aristotle. Philoponus’ commentary is taken from the seminars of Ammonuoius, with his own reflections added. The adoption of Proclus’ theory is expanded on by Verrycken in his essay sited previously. He explains how each level of the soul,; vegetative, irrational and rational, necessarily animates a corresponding body; the coarse, pneumatic and astral body. The coarse and pneumatic body are subject to generation and corruption, and this equally obtains for the vegetative and irrational soul. The human rational soul by contrast is both un-generated and immortal and the same holds for the astral body it eternally animates​[132]​


Philoponus deals with the controversy between Plato and Aristotle by agreeing with Aristotle’s attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion:; “He is right therefore to remove necessity forom the argument first, since it is not necessarily the case that the soul by causing movement will itself also be subject to movement,(Van Der Eijk)”​[133]​ bBut  later in the text Philoponus offers what Sorabji suggests may be Ammonious’ interpretation of Plato’s apparently physicalist account of the soul in Timaeus as symbolic. “All he says about the soul as if he were speaking about an extended entity is symbolical. For if the soul that is divided in the bodies is not a body…it is evident that the soul that is above that is not a body either; and if it is not a body, it is not a magnitude at all (Van Der Eijk).”​[134]​ Moreover, Aristotle is treated as realising this and as attacking only a literalist misinterpretation of Plato; “Clearly then he (Aristotle) too knows in what sense Plato said these things and his refutations are not directed to them but to those who interpret that apparent meaning wrongly..(Van Der Eijk)”​[135]​ ​[136]​









Treatment of the Ssoul-body Uunion

At 201, 11 of On Aristotle on the Soul, Philoponus discusses the idea that the soul has parts, and Aristotle’s rejection of the localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body found in Plato’s Timaeus. In
Philoponus finally discusses the idea that the soul has parts and Aristotle’s rejection of the localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body found in Plato’s Timaeus. In De Anima Aristotle states “It is clear that neither does the soul’s capacity to know reside in its being composed of the elements, nor is it the case that because it exercises movement, it is subject to movement itself (Hamlyn).” ​[139]​ Interestingly Aat 201.11, Philoponus reveals his interest in discoveries since Aristotle’s time about nerves and the brain and asks if they do not require some kind of localisation. “One can see anger arising from the blood in the region of the heart, and desire brings the liver simultaneously in a certain condition or has its origin there.” From which this he suggests there may well be:; “Every necessity that each faculty resides in that part in which it is activated(activated.  Van( DerVan Der Eijk).”​[140]​


Material and Ppotential Iintellect

Later in the text Philoponus tackles Aristotle’s unexpected remarks in De Anima where he states that; “It is not yet clear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in the way a sailor is of the ship (Charlton).”​[141]​ By which this Aristotle means it is not clear whether the way in which the soul is the actuality of the body is like the way in which the sailor actualizes the defining functions of the ship. As Sorabji points out, this is potentially controversial,  as the comparison of the soul with a sailor might suggest Plato’s view, which Aristotle rejects, that the human soul can depart from the body in tact. In the Aristotelian school, Alexander switched to discussing whether the art of navigation can be separated from the ship, to which his answer is no. As he states in his De Anima,; “It is impossible that the soul should be in its body as a pilot in his ship (Charlton).”​[142]​ However, Philoponus takes it that Aristotle will allow the intellectual parts of the soul to be separable from the body like a sailor from the ship. “Even if he says that all soul is definitively actuality, he is aware that there is a separate definitive actuality which orders and embellishes and perfects the substrate from the outside, as does the sailor to the ship (Van Der Eijk).”​[143]​ The subtlety of the discussion lies in the in the explanation that the navigator, as one who is exercising the activities of a navigator, cannot exercise these activities in separation from the ship and cannot separate himself from it.​[144]​


As William Charlton explains in his accompanying analysis of his translation of Philoponus’ “On Aristotle on the Intellect”, it was Philoponus’ belief that the human soul was is a non-material substance which exists before its entry into the body in the womb. A result of which being, as Charlton puts it “His (Philoponus) commentary on the De Intellectu contains many things which a modern reader may think are neither sound nor Aristotelian.”​[145]​ With this in mind, let us take a look at what Philoponus has to say regarding the intellect. Aristotle approaches intellect by comparing and contrasting it with sense. He holds that when we perceive something, some part of the body (a sense organ), takes on a quality which is its proper sense-object. For example, when we see something the eye takes on its colour. As Charlton explains, Philoponus holds that the quality, which is a proper object, is received “cognitively.” Philoponus explains:; “(senseSense) receives the forms of these things (colours) in a cognitive manner, so also intellect remains unaffected in respect of its substance but is affected by the intelligibles in that it receives them in a cognitive manner (Charlton).”​[146]​ Charlton points out that the inadequacy of this is cleat clear when we realise that all Philoponus can tell us about “cognitive reception” is that when it befalls sensible things they are perceived, and when thinkable things, they are thought, resulting in which what Charlton suggests is perhaps an “unconscious tautology.”​[147]​


This leads us to the capacity to imagine, which, Charlton explains, belongs to the sub-rational soul and is capable of a completely incorporeal existence. With this in mind,However, Philoponus’ views on perception are not necessarily exhausted by his principle of cognitive reception, as he goes on to describe how our soul has three kinds of body; a solid one of flesh and bone; a pneumatic one composed mainly of air and a heavenly one of the same form as light and the stars. The heavenly body is eternal and this has senses of its own which are immune to perceptual illusions and enable the soul to know sensible things even when it is completely separate from the other two bodies.

 Philoponus 
This leads us too the capacity to imagine, which, Charlton explains, belongs to the sub-rational soul and is incapable of a completely incorporeal existence. With this in mind, Philoponus takes issue with Aristotle’s position that it is impossible to think without exercising imagination. Aristotle claims:; “If this (thinking) too is a form of imagination or does not existt apart from imagination, it would not be possible even for this to exist apart from the body (Hamlyn).” ​[148]​ Philoponus tries to explain these texts by saying that we rarely think without imagining; “Rarely indeed, hardly once in the whole life of those who ascend to the highest levels of philosophy, does intellect operate without imagination (Charlton)”​[149]​ and that imagining is necessary for practical thinking and the mathematical sciences; “oOf Geometrical and any other kind of understanding that is similar (Charlton).​[150]​ It is not however necessary for logic:; “Intellect does not need an image when it does proofs of logic (Charlton)”​[151]​ and still less for theology; “In the case of abstract things sense intuits the things themselves and sends them back to imagination (Charlton).”​[152]​







The Mmortality of Aactive Iintellect
	

Philoponus identifies imagination with passive intellect; “Even if intellect is unaffected and because of that we ought not to forget, still imagination is destructible (Charlton)”​[158]​We will remember that Aristotle says that the passive intellect is destructible; “The passive intellect is perishable and without this (active intellect) thinks nothing (Hamlyn).”​[159]​ Since Philoponus holds that intellect is in general indestructible and that this goes for what Aristotle describes as; “iIntellect which becomes all things, (Hymlyn)”​[160]​ Philoponus must make passive intellect different from the intellect which becomes and identical with this some or whole of the sub-rational soulPhiloponus must make passive intellect different from the intellect which becomes and identical with this some or the whole of the sub-rational soul. Charlton suggests that this generates awkwardness in the commentary since it is clear that Aristotle himself takes the passive intellect and the intellect which becomes as identical.​[161]​


Charlton believes that Aristotle introduces his distinction between the intellect which becomes, and the intellect which makes, in such a way that he conceived of its as a matter-form distinction. This is a point Philoponus does not find puzzling because his own theory of the body-soul relationship is dualistic.  Aristotle, however, explains it as the relationship between the matter and the form of a living thing that is, he explains, our psychological concepts are concepts of living things on their formal aspects. As Charlton our psychological concepts as concepts of living things on their formal aspects. As Charlton points out, it  is a surprise therefore to find Aristotle trying to apply a form-matter distinction within the realm of the psychological. ​[162]​


Charlton highlights that most, but not all, attribute to Aristotle the idea that the lower psychological concepts are matter-concepts relatively to the higher. Here he draws the analogy that; “As a brink and beams are form relatively to clay and wood but matter relatively to a house, so the concept of a perceiver is a form-concept relatively to that of flesh or even that of a self-nourisher, but a matter-concept relatively to that of a thinker.”​[163]​ On this line of interpretation the difference between the two intellects can be explained as a difference between powers. The passive intellect would be either a second rate intellectual capacity, or some of the sub-intellectual capacities among which that of imagining would be prominent. The passive intellect would be destructible if a thing could not have these powers without having a body.​[164]​


On this premise Philoponus could accept such an interpretation of passive intellect and still maintain that Aristotle allows for personal immorality if he allows for two further theses: ; firstly, that that Aristotle does not truly hold that all thought involves imagination. ; sSecondly, that Aristotle rejects the principle that whatever is at any tome time composed of material matter is essentially material. Charlton explains that which while Philoponus does maintain the first of these theses, he would not maintain the second, for as a dualist Philoponus holds that that which thinks is at no time composed of materialmatter.​[165]​


This leads us the to Philoponus’ theory of thought. Philoponus holds that the rational soul or intellect has three fold cognitive powers for judgement; reasoning; and intuitive thought. These models of cognition are not prominent in Aristotle. Instead we find what Charlton describes as the “puzzling claims”​[166]​ that knowledge, like perceiving, comes about through receiving form without matter:; “If (thinking) must be unaffected, but capable of receiving the form and potentially such as it, although not identical with it. (Hamlyn)”​[167]​ By this Aristotle implies that to acquire knowledge of something is to become like it, just as when we perceive something, a sense organ takes on its perceptible form. Clearly there is a problem with this line of reasoning. Although as Charlton points out, , whatever objects of knowledge Aristotle has in mind, it is self-evidently true that; “tThe ornithologist does not become a bird or the geometer a triangle.”​[168]​ As such we must now look at whether Philoponus’ commentary helps to clarify the explanation of intellectual cognition and the doctrine that knowledge is identical with the thing known.


In chapter four of the De Anima Aristotle questions self knowledge in the context of the question as to how an individual thinker is aware of himself:; “Given that the intellect is something simple and unaffected and that it has nothing in common with anything else…how will it think, if thinking is being affected in some way? (Hamlyn)”​[169]​ A dilemma arises in that if he is aware of himself by virtue of having some property or other than that of being a thinker, then that contradicts statements that he has no such property, but is “unaffected and unmixed. (Hamlyn)”​[170]​ A dilemma arises in that if he is aware of himself by virtue of having some property or other than that of being a thinker, that contradicts statements that he has no such property, but is “unaffected and unmixed.”​[171]​ However, if being a thinker is what makes him a thing of which he is aware, shall we not have to say that anything else of which we are aware is a thinker too and hence that all things think? As Charlton highlights, Philoponus firmly grasps the second horn of the dilemma; “Is it not false” he says “That every intelligible is an intellect, but true and necessary (Charlton).”​[172]​ He argues that this is the case, as if intelligibles which are separated from matter are not intellects. Rather that, they will have no activity, since the only possible activity for non-material things is thought. But nothing can exist which does not have some activity:; “Of of necessity, then, separate intelligible things will also be intellects (Charlton).”​[173]​ As Charlton explains, this argument applies only to intelligible objects which exist apart from matter, and although Plato may have thought that Forms are such entities yet did think, a Christian like Philoponus might readily suppose that such entities are things like angels and God.​[174]​  although Plato may have thought that Forms are such entities yet dido not think, a Christian like Philoponus might readily suppose that such entities are things like angels and God.​[175]​


On the issue of the more everyday objects of intellectual thought Aristotle states: ; “When the intellect thinks something especially fit for thought, it thinks inferior things not less but rather more. For the faculty of sense-perception is not independent of the body, whereas the intellect is distinct (Hamlyn)t.”​[176]​ Commenting on this assertion, Philoponus offers his account of the intellect’s self- knowledge. He states that on the issue of reflection, he Aristotle says that since understanding things is becoming them, in understanding them intellect understands itself:; “Intellect, having become actual, is intelligible forms, then it is natural that when it becomes actual it has an understanding of itself too (Charlton).” ​[177]​ Here something other than say Gods or angels are at play, it could, say, say be such things as a horse or a triangle that are actually thought of only when intellect represents it. The object of actual thought, then, is strictly speaking not the physical triangle or the form of the real life horse, but the form the intellect has assumed, and this is actually operating intellect itself. This, says Charlton, is an; “Ingenious ingenious and internally consistent interpretation of some very obscure Aristotelian doctrine.”​[178]​


It is clear here that Philoponus has read Alexander’s De Anima with much attention. For example, Alexander’s remarkes in his De Anima that; “Prior to the intellect’s act of knowing, the knowing faculty and the thing known stand apart, and are opposed to each other as members in a relationship (Fotinis)”​[179]​ has close parallels to Philoponus’ assertion that; “That which is intellect in potentiality is relative to what is intelligible in potentiality and these two are opposed. But when they come to be in actuality they are no longer opposed; they come to be one thing (Charton).”​[180]​ Indeed Philoponus’ identification of intelligible with intellects could well have been inspired by Alexander’s speculations, especially when he asserts that when the intellect is dealing with composite entities; “ iIt makes their essences and forms into objects intelligible to itself by separating them from the (material) conditions under which they exist (Fotinis).”​[181]​ However, Philoponus does not slavishly follow Alexander, since he is mixing into his theory a dualism which is absent in Alexander. His interpretation then holds strong, although there may well be a reluctance to attribute such a doctrine to Aristotle himself.


Immortality and Ppre Eexistence of the Ssoul

On the question of the possible immorality of the soul, Philoponus states that the; “iIntellect which makes” meaning the active intellect, is; a “sSeparate and unmixed being in essence activity” and that; “iIn separation it is just what it is and this alone is immortal and eternal (Hamlyn).”​[182]​  As we have seen previously, most modern commentators refuse to read this as an assertion by Aristotle of a confirmation of personal immortality, so at odds as itt it is with his doctrine of hylomorphism. Philoponus, however, asserts with an almost obsessive repetitiveness that Aristotle makes; “tThe rational soul in us”​[183]​ immortal. He also argues that the rational soul exists before birth: ; “If it (the rational soul) is not pre-existent, its must have had a beginning to its existence. If it began to be, it is wholly necessary on the other hand on the same account that it should have a limit (Charlton).”​[184]​


The first argument works on the principle that whatever is generable is corruptible, so if the soul is immortal it must have existed froorm all eternity but; “Everything which has a beginning in time has a limit in time (Charlton).”​[185]​ The second argument holds that the universe has always existed for an infinite length of time and has always contained men. Thus, there must have been infinitely many human beings. But if each man has his own soul created at birth, and these souls are immortal they there would be an infinite number of souls, which, he state says, can not be so. Thus some souls must be “used” again and again.​[186]​ “Either the soul passes away into that which does not exist at all (Charlton).”​[187]​ We can tell from this that Philoponus has not rejected the Aristotelian doctrine that the universe has existed infinitely; for if he had he could have held that there are a finite number of men who’s souls are created on conception.










By means of a recapitulation recapitulation on Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotelian intellect we shall briefly look at Philoponus’ theory of self- awareness. In his essay found in Sorabji’s text Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science,​[189]​ Wolfgang Bernard explores Philoponus’ theory of self-awareness in his article “Philoponus on self-awareness.”. Bernard suggests that the “perception of perception” as mapped out here in Aristotle’s text could be explained as the cognition of the presence of the perceptible forming dissociation from matter, which is the immediate result of the discriminatory activity of sense perception. He suggests that on Aristotle is saying that every single sense perceives both its proper objects and its own act of perceiving that proper object​[190]​. A particularly interesting passage comes to light when Philoponus states that; “They they (the most recent exponents) say that it is the take of the attentive part of the rational soul to apprehend the acts of the senses” for the rational soul has an additional sixth faculty; “which they call the attentive (Van Der Eijk).”​[191]​ It is the attentive which apprehends the acts of the senses; : “It attends to what is going on in the person and says “I have thought noeticallynoetically”, “I have judged”, “I have been angry.”​[192]​ In this sense attentiveness infers that the phenomenon of self-awareness can be explained by assuming there is a special faculty of the soul which cognises the acts of the soul.


Bernard points out the view attributed to “more recent exponents” is striking in its resemblance to modern positions, deriving the unity of self-awareness from the unity of the person. Although as Bernard points out the repetitionletion of the term “they say…” indicates that which while not disputing the phenomenon of “attentiveness” Philoponus is not in agreement that it constitutes a faculty of the soul. Instead, for Philoponus, it is for Philoponus an ability possessed by reason. On this point we find Philoponus in agreement with Aristotle in assertion that there is no sixth sense to perceive the act of perception.


He argues, however, againstHowever, he argues against Aristotle’s assertion that the act of vision is coloured, in a manner of speaking. He states that t; “iIf one sees colour or that which possesses colour, then, if one is to see that which sees, that which sees primarily will have colour .(Hamlyn.)”​[193]​. Philoponus asserts that that it makes no sense to speak of perception apprehending its own acts, for apprehension of one’s own acts is the same as reflecting on one’s self, and what is able to reflect on one’s self is able to act in separation from the body and thus must be eternal and incorporeal. But the perceptive faculty is neither of these things and therefore could never reflect upon orof apprehend its own acts.​[194]​ Philoponus holds strong to the view that that reason is the principle of all cognition; all acts of discrimination are performed by reason. As such on Philoponus’ account there are no two faculties that apprehend, say colour, there is only one:; reason. Bernard suggests that in its bound activity seeing, reason in this activity can equally be called “vision”​[195]​, which is what Aristotle does not call it:; “Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another sense (Hamlyn.)”​[196]​ In this sense vision is nothing more than; “The adzee adaze which makes the throne (Van Der Eijk).” ​[197]​ Reason is the craftsman who uses his tool of vision to see. However we must remember that later in De Anima Aristotle does say that; “Reason reason is the principle which gives unity to all the psychical acts (Hamlynn.),’”​[198]​ which suggests that reason is the active principle of all cognition. This may seem a controverstial conclusion given that it infers that animal cognition is purely passive. None the less  sSuch a statement may infer that Philoponus’ theory of self-awareness is closer to that of Aristotle than weay may first think.






































It is with Bernard that we shall end our discussion into of Alexander’s and Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotelian intellect, for his point about Philoponus’; criticism of Aristotle operating on the level of dialectical methodology rather than philosophical positioning is an interesting one. What we see in Philoponus’ assessment of Aristotelian intellect is not the overt mission of a Platonist attempting to undermine the Aristotelian position, but rather it may be seen as a shrewd adoption of a kind of Socratic Methodmethod, seeking to elucidate Aristotle’s position through a series of critiquescriticisms. It is in this way that we ultimately find Philoponus and Aristotle in a closer position of mutual understanding than may first have been anticipated.


By contrast the card carrying 	By contract the resolutely Aristotelian Alexander appears to slip further and further away from the philosophical positioning of his master when in insisting on the transcendental interpretation of active intellect as being immortal and eternal. Of course, we must remember, as we did in the introduction, that this assertion is based on my own position that a literal, transcendent interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks in chapter five of De Anima appear to be at odds with the rest of the text and moreover with the wider Aristotelian doctrine, in particular his steadfast instance on the principles of hylomophism. None the less it is my belief that Alexander lost his Aristotelian way when it came to active intellect, perhaps proving Paul Merlan right in his belief that Alexander’s interpretation of active intellect as divine leads to him becoming a kind of “semi-Platonizans.”​[202]​


It appears clear from the rest of the Alexander’s text that this is not his intention, at least not explicitly. On the issue of soul composition, perception and imagination Alexander holds true to his master. However it would seem on the issue of the immortality of active intellect Alexander, wwhethereather intentionally or otherwise, does adopt a kind of quasi-platonic Platonic position. In this way I would suggest that his text is less of a success than that of Philoponus as, perhaps ironically, in that same way as the issue appeared to contradict the rest of Aristotle’s text, the same could well be said of Alexander’s De Anima.


If Alexander’s intention was to synthesize Aristotelian principles with those of Platonism, through adopting a kind of Platonism ‘through the back door’ approach, Philoponus’ synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic ideals plays out in a far more sophisticated way. As a defender of Aristotle, Alexander was always caught between compliance with his master, and defense of his own theories. On the reverse, Philoponus, as a critic, was free to be more selective as to at which points he agrees and disagrees with Aristotle. It is in this way that the doctrine of the immortality of soul appears without contradiction in his text. I believe, therefore, that it is in the way that Philoponus provides the most elucidating approach to Aristotle’s theory of intellect.
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